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Kurdish Women Guerrilla Fighters 
 




Abstract: This article focuses on the female fighters of the PKK. 
The media over the past four years have continued to report about 
the female inclusion into this male dominated resistance group, the 
PKK in Turkey. The addition of women to the fight spread to 
various Kurdish resistance groups throughout the Middle East. 
The interviews brought about a plethora of questions about 
egalitarian rights for women entering the PKK. The questions that 
arose are: How equal are women’s rights? Are there any 
stipulations? Why are females willing to fight for the cause and 
what do these women gain by fighting alongside the men? To begin 
answering these questions, a brief historical background is needed 
to fully understand the women’s inclusion into the PKK and the 











Female Kurdish Fighters Take Arms Against Islamic State Extremists.  
Photo by Jan Sefti1 
 
 
Mitra spent her formative years feeling oppressed by a culturally 
and religiously male dominated society prior to abandoning her 
family to join the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) as a guerilla 
fighter. Consequently, Mitra decided that she would rather dedicate 
her life to the danger of the battlefield than to live a lifetime of 
oppression, welcoming and embracing the possibility of death. 
Currently, Mitra is a PKK commander residing in the desolate 
Qandil Mountains near the border dividing Iraq and Kurdistan. 
Here, she commands and trains a unit consisting entirely of women 
at a camp that holds approximately one thousand Kurdish rebels, 
of which forty percent are women. Soon these women will be sent 
to fight on the frontlines of Syria, and potentially Turkey, if peace 
talks with the Turkish government fail. However, there is a major 
stipulation to joining the PKK - both men and women are equally 
                                                
1 Jan Sefti, “Female Kurdish Fighters Take Arms Against Islamic State 
Extremists,” August 21, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/female-
kurdish-fighters-take-arms-islamic-state-extremists/. Photo courtesy of Jan Sefti, 
PBS Newshour (NPR), accessed May 10, 2015. 
 




prohibited from having romantic encounters. As an unwritten rule, 
women fight harder than men to maintain freedom. But this does 
not bother Mitra. By not thinking about men, love, or passion, 
more time and energy can be dedicated towards the struggle to 
create an independent Kurdish state.2 
The above narrative is common among Syrian and Turkish 
women who join the PKK. The PKK has been charged with 
spearheading a vast movement towards gender equality that has 
become popular among other Kurdish guerilla groups. 
Furthermore, the female acceptance of the PKK has grown 
increasingly throughout the Kurdish communities. Today it is 
common for women to openly speak about gender egalitarianism 
in public. On March 20, 2014, at the celebration of International 
Women’s Day in Syria, Sharmiran Sham’un, the Christian deputy 
of Cizire Canton Foreign Office, spoke to a massive, primarily 
female crowd. Sham’un pointed out that a nation is not truly free 
unless the residing women are equally free. She continued, “We 
must follow Kurdish women as models, who have taken up arms to 
defend their gender rights, land and honour.”3 Though Kurdish 
gender equality for women has spawned somewhat from the PKK, 
Kurdish women were not originally considered equal to men with 
the creation of the party. Mitra, for example, explains that she had 
to fight harder than men in order to prove that she was worthy of 
maintaining her place in the party.4 In theory, men and women are 
considered equal in the PKK, but a question remains about what 
extent the PKK actually practices gender equality. 
This paper will seek to uncover what gender equality truly 
means for female cadres within the PKK, and to what extent 
equality is practiced. As we will see, the motives for promoting 
gender equality were not based on benevolence or fairness, but 
rather on the party’s own ulterior motives. Gender egalitarianism 
                                                
2 Jihar Gol, “Who are the Female Fighters of the PKK?” January 5, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25610424. 








evolved out of political necessity, as well as the desire for ethnic 
and cultural preservation. The creation of gender reform under the 
PKK is overshadowed by traditional Kurdish values giving the 
PKK the appearance of being a liberally progressive party. The 
promise of gender equality is not the only incentive for Kurdish 
women to join the PKK. Kurdish women claim that there are a 
multitude of factors that called them to leave their families and join 
the PKK as guerilla fighters in the mountains. By offering women 
an outlet from the culturally restricting customs it allows them to 
continue education seemingly without gender discrimination and 
the apparent freedom to enjoy equal gender and social status within 
the party.   
This paper will seek to assess the common narrative of 
gender equality and shed light on the many restrictions women 
face in comparison to their male counterparts within the PKK. It 
will examine the influences and motives for women’s participation 
in the movement, as well as the impact it has had on gender 
egalitarianism. The research will explore if there is a lasting impact 
for women rights within the Kurdish and Turkish societies and 
throughout the Middle East. In doing so, this paper uses 
interviews, primary and secondary documents, news articles, 
books, journal articles, and documentaries to enable a historical 
narrative that will determine the impact of the PKK. The guerilla 
movement is constantly evolving, partly in response to outsiders’ 
labels of them as a terrorist group, but their goal of autonomy 
remains the same. The various Kurdish groups have been 
misunderstood throughout the 19th century and this research 
attempts to bring an understanding to this vast group of people. 
Indeed, this paper argues that despite restrictions within the 
movement, the women have interestingly learned to use the male 
dominated political game to their advantage for their egalitarian 
ends. They seek to use the grassroots methods to patiently spread 
the equal rights for women within a group to their Kurdish society 
and ultimately to women throughout the Middle East. The women 
of the PKK have begun a concise movement to legitimize female 
 




rights that if successful could change the societal structure of a 
male dominated world.   
 
The Kurdish Historical Background 
 
A background of the Kurdish people is needed to fully understand 
the discrimination of the Kurdish culture and its foundation as a 
specific group of people without a home. The Kurdish people are 
one of the oldest cultural groups to inhabit the Middle East and 
have co-existed with various peoples throughout their history. 
During the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were considered 
independent with the authority to run their own government and 
practice their culture. Complications for the Kurdish people began 
during the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when the partitioning of the 
empire and conflicting backdoor agreements by European 
imperialists created a cultural, ethnic, and ideological self-
awareness throughout the Middle East. As a result, the Kurdish 
people were inexplicably denied their own independent Kurdistan. 
Thus, the Kurds became displaced in their own land, stretched 
across a vast amount of space that includes parts of Iran, Iraq, 
Turkey, and Syria. These countries in their own nationalist fervor 
refuse to recognize the cultural and linguistic values of the Kurdish 
people, resulting in constant prejudice and persecution. 
The Kurdish mobilization towards nationalism, like all 
nationalist movements, is extremely complex and full of 
international controversy. There is not a single time frame in 
history where the Kurds flipped the proverbial light switch to 
illuminate Kurdish nationalism; the movement was gradual and 
took place over a long span of time. Despite the fact that Kurdish 
history can be intriguing, the totality of Kurdish history is not 
necessarily relevant to understanding the purpose of this paper. A 
brief background to the Kurds does however; shed light on the 
progression of history in Kurdish society. This in turn will serve as 






reasons as to why and how women came to be involved in the 
Kurdish national struggle. 
 The Kurds can be dated as far back as 3000 BCE. There is 
little if any doubt among scholars of Middle Eastern history that 
the Kurds are one of the most ancient ethnic groups in the Middle 
East. 5 Written and oral historiographies indicate that a majority of 
the Kurds typically date themselves to the Median Empire of the 
sixth century BCE.6 Strangely, however, the Kurds share a similar 
genealogy with Persians and are often credited for being the purest 
Iranians.7 However interesting this may be, Kurdish identity 
(Kurdayetî) is not ethnically specific, but also takes into account 
religion. 8 The development and spread of Islam throughout the 
Middle East caused the Kurds, as well as many other people 
groups in the Middle East, to relieve themselves of their old 
religious identity and traditions and convert to the new 
monotheistic religion. 9  
The conversion of the Kurds to Islam is not only significant 
for understanding their culture and distinctiveness in the Middle 
East, but also sculpts new intrinsic values within Kurdish society. 
Understanding plurality in values is essential because, in general, 
the Kurdish absorption of Islam may seem like a unifying 
phenomenon that would fuse tribes together. On the contrary, the 
Islamic movement in Kurdistan sub-fractionalized Kurdish groups 
due to the complexity stemming from the interpretation of the 
Quran. In other words, despite the fact that the Kurds are a single 
ethnic group under one religion, there is a differentiation among 
their affiliation with various Islamic sects, namely Sunni and Shi’a. 
Furthermore, Islamic traditions also define gender roles in which 
women are seen as relatively unequal to men. Therefore the 
                                                
5 Lokman I. Meho, Kurdish Culture and Society (Westport: Greenwood Press, 
2001), 11. 
6 Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, 
Turkey, and Iran (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005), xvii. 
7 Ibid., xxiii-xxiv. 
8 Ibid., xxiv. 
9 Ibid. 
 




redefining of gender and gender roles in Kurdish society, which 
will be discussed later, is revolutionary, and quickly stirs up 
controversy throughout Kurdistan. This is one of many causes for 
the formation of ideologically mismatched jigsaw pieces in the 
otherwise potentially contiguous and independent Kurdistan. 
Culturally, Shi’a Kurds and Persians hold a relationship of 
relatively mutual respect for one another, while Sunni Kurds and 
Sunni Arabs West of Iran have a turbulent and volatile 
relationship.10 Religion also paved the way for the political identity 
which was mainly impacted by the Ottoman Empire. This is to say 
that religion and specific groups were given higher status in the 
empire and eventually the religious sectors in the Ottoman 
government would undermine the ruling power of the caliphate 
system since the empire was partially dictated by religious law. 
There was no separation of religion and state. 
Though the Kurds have endured centuries of various 
fluctuating empires, none impacted the modern Kurds as much as 
the Ottoman Empire and the nations that subsequently inherited 
them following the empire’s fatal collapse. Early Ottoman history 
with the Kurds may initially seem mundane in relation to the 
modern Kurdistan, but Ottoman policies actually laid the 
groundwork for the future of the Kurds and their persecution. The 
Ottomans divided their empire into sub-regions under what is 
known as the millet system. Instead of strictly dissecting the 
empire on an ethnic basis, the Ottomans primarily focused on 
subdividing the land on religious affiliation, Muslim, or non-
Muslim. In addition, it should be noted that the Ottoman 
government also put into consideration the complex linguistic and 
tribal entities of the empire to inhibit conflict. Since the Kurds 
were Muslim, they were at a political and societal advantage under 
the millet system, and were referred to as boz millet, “the gray 
nation,”11 while non-Muslim groups were millet-i mahkume, or 
“dominated people,” and given less autonomy in their millets.12 On 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 1. 






the other hand, Muslim groups such as the Kurds were millet-i 
hakime, “dominate people,” and enjoyed a greater autonomy 
within their millets, and a less discriminatory integration into 
Ottoman politics.13   
However, the Kurds lost some of their autonomy when the 
Porte (Ottoman parliament) began establishing the Tanzimat 
reforms (reorganization) beginning roughly around 1839 and 
lasting until 1876.14 This was an overhaul of the outdated political 
system in an attempt to prevent the empire from collapsing. The 
economy in Western Europe was expanding due to colonialism, 
and the Ottoman Empire was closely watching the successful 
European nations in order to gain some insight on how to preserve 
the empire. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire attempted to become 
more “European.” Many empires during the colonial era used the 
European model of westernization in order to survive and keep up 
with the new demands of a beginning globalized economy. For 
example, the Tanzimat period included a revamping of the 
Ottoman legal system, Mejelle, by emulating the French civil code 
while still maintaining Islamic principles upheld through shari’ah 
law, a legal system based on the ethics within the Quran.15 The 
destruction of the millet system also directly affected the Kurds. In 
1839 Rashid Pasha issued a decree, the Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane, 
which stated reforms for all of those living within the Ottoman 
Empire regardless of religion.16 Then in 1856, the Hatt-i Hümayan 
decree greatly emphasized that all Ottoman subjects would be 
made equal.17 Finally in 1869, the Nationality Law was enacted 
which granted equal citizenship to all Ottoman subjects.18 This was 
done by way of giving control to governors who were elected by 
                                                
13 Ibid., 2. 
14 Ibid., 5. 
15 William L. Cleveland and Martin Burton, A History of the Modern Middle 
East, 4th edition (Westview Press, 2009), 84. 








the Porte.19 The Kurds only lost little autonomy, and were still able 
to maintain their local political systems under Kurdish shayks and 
aghas (chiefs).20         
 Following the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire 
was disassembled which created a domino effect of nationalism 
throughout the Middle East that greatly affected the Kurds. 
Nationalism spread throughout the Middle East after WWI for 
many reasons. One factor had been the world powers and their 
ideological influences in each area of the Past Ottoman Empire. 
Each group that fought for a side was promised their own 
autonomy away from the Ottomans and had been influenced by 
ideologies from Russia, Great Britain, America, France, and 
Greece and the other colonial powers. Another factor was that 
many leading figures from the Middle East after WWI had a 
western education and learned about the ideology of nationalism. 
They noted how uniting a state could be achieved if everyone in an 
autonomous state were bound by borders and a common national 
identity. A rising power needed the acceptance of the western 
world for protection and legitimacy. Specifically, the establishment 
of Turkey created a new world of uniformed identity that all 
citizens were required to adhere to the Kemal Reforms which were 
successful because the Tanzimat Reforms had set a precedent. 
Since the 100 years of Tanzimat Reforms weakened the religious 
sects of government, Muslims and non-Muslims gained equality in 
an empire that was losing control to the invading colonialists. The 
Ottoman reforms allowed for a Western shift in the empire that set 
the foundation for acceptance of future reforms in Turkey.  








Establishment of Turkey21           
 
The fall of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a profound sense of 
cultural, ethnic and ideological self-awareness throughout the 
Middle East. When the victors of World War I divided the Middle 
East into distinct regions, the Kurdish people were inexplicably 
denied their own independent Kurdistan. Thus, the Kurds are 
spread across a vast amount of space that includes parts of Iran, 
Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. These countries have their own idea of 
nationalism and refuse to recognize the cultural and linguistic 
values of the Kurdish people. As such, the Kurds are under 
constant prejudice and persecution by the country in which they 
reside. The Kurdish people formed several resistance groups in 
response to this on-going struggle for nationalism. The 
establishment of Turkey specifically altered the lives of the 
Kurdish people under their control. 
The nineteenth century, consisted of European powers 
meddling within areas of the Middle East to control resources by 
establishing colonies which weakened the Ottoman Empire. The 
Allied powers continued to influence the Middle East post-World 
War I by dismantling the Ottoman Empire through the Treaty of 
Sèrves granting the Allied forces self-determination for some and 
allowing western powers to claim territories for their strategic 
influence. The Secret agreements had been circulating among 
Britain, France, Russia, Greece, and Italy and were defined in the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The agreements would distribute 
borders to the allies and form a divided Middle East in search of 
various nationalisms. The Treaty divided Anatolia between Italy 
                                                
21 The history of Turkey has directly affected the fundamental actions of the 
PKK and contributed to the issue of gender equality. For this reason, Turkey 
will be the focus of the research as it is in direct conflict with the PKK. Mustafa 
Kemal or “Ataturk,” the leading figure for significant reforms within Turkey, 
was also the main contributor of opposition towards the Kurds. The Kemalist 
Reforms were intended to secularize Turkey and were initiated by Ataturk. 
Ataturk’s reforms attempted to create a loyal and uniformed state by creating 
only Turkish citizens. This prohibited the practice of any other culture that could 
possibly undermine a uniformed Turkish state. 
 




and France, creating an independent Armenian state, and granted 
Greece territory that neared Istanbul. Among the agreements was 
the promise of a sovereign Kurdistan for the Kurdish population of 
the Ottoman Empire. The Society for the Ascension of Kurdistan 
(Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti) sent Serif Pasha22as their representative 
at the conference to discuss their claims to a bordered territory. 
The Kurdish representatives were divided as they could not agree 
on where Kurdistan should reside. However, the Treaty of Sèrves 
in Section III Articles 62-6423 defined Kurdistan within the Mosul 
Provence. The treaty outlined an autonomous state for the Kurdish 
people, but the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne nixed any hope for 
a Kurdish state in Turkey. Ultimately, the Treaty of Sèrves 
restricted what was left of the Ottoman Empire and put allied 
commissions and governmental finances under allied control. The 
Istanbul government signed the treaty in 1920 to cut bonds with 
Turkish and non-Turkish areas that were awarded to the European 
victors, but the European powers were met with opposition.  
Turkish resistance groups comprised of militia units and 
guerilla fighters formed in an attempt to stop the division of 
Turkish territory. The rebel forces called themselves Societies for 
the Defense of Rights and formed to protect their land from the 
aims of the treaty and to begin their national war for independence 
in 1919, with the prior Ottoman field commander as their 
organizing leader.24 The national movement for Turkish 
sovereignty was led by Mustafa Kemal who easily asserted his 
leadership. The Istanbul government, aware of Kemal’s plans, 
revoked his official stance as an army officer in 1920, making him 
a rebel leader who opposed the legitimacy of the Istanbul 
                                                
22 Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, 
Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2004), 112.  
23 “The treaty of peace between the allied and associated powers, 1995-2012,” 
Hellenic Resources Network, accessed May 19, 2014, 
http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part3.html.!
24 James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press, 






government. Kemal was dismissed as an army officer because he 
wished to protect Turkish land from the encroaching Greeks which 
went against the government and only heightened the fact that 
Istanbul no longer protected Turkish interests. This in turn, 
motivated the unification of Turkey, led by Kemal, and the 
overthrow of the Istanbul government. Kemal understood that he 
needed to legitimize his movement for Turkish sovereignty by 
creating a new Turkish government to replace the Istanbul 
government with proper representation in 1920. The process of 
establishing a government took place in Ankara, where the rebels 
chose their body of representatives that included members from the 
prior Ottoman parliament. The newly formed government was 
known as the Grand National Assembly, who then nominated 
Mustafa Kemal as their president. The National Assembly idolized 
Kemal and renamed him Ataturk which meant “the father of the 
Turks” in 1935.25 The national assembly adopted the Western 
principles of popular sovereignty accompanied with a constitution. 
The establishment of a constitutional Turkish government and the 
invasion of Armenia, with aid from the Soviet Union, was the first 
step towards disassembling the Treaty of Sevres.26 Ataturk 
considered the newly independent Armenia to be Turkish land and 
therefore invalid as an Armenian state. The territorial gains 
allowed Turkey the advantage to fight off the Greek invasion. The 
Greek forces became a threat to the new government as they 
invaded the prior Ottoman capital of Bursa and breached Anatolia 
in 1921.27 In the same year, France and the Soviet Union 
acknowledged Turkey as a legitimate state leading to the Italian 
withdrawal from Anatolia. The second strike to the treaty was the 
Turkish nationalist defeat of the Greek troops in a three week 
battle at Sakarya in 1922, which left Ataturk victorious with his 
goals nearly achieved. 
                                                
25 Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and 
the Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1997). 
26 Gelvin, 179. 
27 Ibid. 
 




The achievements by Ataturk’s forces led to a renegotiation 
of the Treaty of Sèrves in the Lausanne Conference of 1922. In the 
conference, Ataturk demanded recognition from the British for 
complete Turkish Sovereignty and to abolish the Sultanate, which 
would eliminate the caliphate’s role as a source of political power. 
That strategic act would completely eliminate the Ottoman past 
and authority, allowing the National Assembly full legitimate 
control of Turkey. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923, 
officially recognizing Turkey as an independent nation state by the 
international community.  
After Ataturk accomplished his goal of a sovereign Turkey, 
the next step was to establish Turkey as a uniform nation. He 
achieved this by carrying out a series of reforms that would result 
in a controlled and lasting state with a common Turkish identity. 
The Kemalist Reforms (Ataturkism) of Turkey were a set of 
reforms that were based on European nationalism and are seen in 
six distinct sections to unify the state under a sole Turkish identity. 
Understanding the cataclysm of the reforms is vital to 
comprehending the current conflict between the Kurdish rebels and 
Turkey. Ataturk’s reforms contained two purposes for Turkey; one 
was to Westernize Turkey for its future inclusion into the European 
world stage for legitimacy and to unify the country through a 
common identity known as “Turkification” which took on the form 
of nationalism. The Kemalist reforms had drastic effects on dual 
populations that existed in the land before the establishment of 
Turkey. The reforms of Ataturk were successful because of the 
constant state of reforms of the Ottoman Empire (Tanzimat 
Reforms) during the nineteenth century. The prior reforms allowed 
the Kemalist Reforms a precedent to follow and allowed for a large 
acceptance of the changes being promoted in Turkey. The 
establishment of secularism, through the reforms, brought by far 
the most significant change in Turkey. 
The introduction of secularism tremendously impacted 
Turkish society and entailed multiple changes for the state. 
Ataturk’s policy of secularism was passed by the National 






understood that by exiling the Ottoman royal families (Caliphs) 
that generational Islamic traditions would be exiled with them. The 
reforms also dismantled the religious organizations that protected, 
taught and aided the Islamic traditions. In 1926, the Swiss Civil 
Code outlawed the Mejelle and the Shari’ah authority, replacing it 
with new penal and commercial restrictions. The legal codes 
banned polygamy and granted women access to divorce, which 
extinguished the Ulama’s elitist stance in government matters. The 
civil codes embodied Western values of secularism to replace the 
traditional laws of religion, as interpreted from the Quran, which 
shifted the power base to the secularist state officials and away 
from the religious authorities.28  
The reforms also dissolved the Sufi orders by prohibiting 
their worship at shrines and tombs, making it a criminal offense in 
1925. The tradition of wearing a Fez in public areas was a link to 
the Ottoman past and, to destroy the Ottoman hold on Turkey, the 
Fez was made illegal to wear in public. Instead, the Fez was 
replaced by Western hats in 1925 to symbolize Turkey’s ‘civilized’ 
Westernization.  The reforms of Ataturk went further to resemble a 
Western nation by replacing the Muslim lunar calendar with the 
Western Gregorian calendar in 1926. In order for Turkey to keep 
up with the world markets they implemented a Western calendar, 
which included the adoption of Sunday as a day of rest instead of 
their traditional Friday. To further secularize, the state 
commissioned the translation of the Quran from Arabic to Turkish 
in 1932. The translation of God’s direct words was highly 
controversial and seen as altering its important meanings. The 
reforms also stated that public prayers would change to Turkish 
instead of Arabic. The main purpose for the secularist section of 
reforms was to rid Turkey of the Islamic power base that could 
compete for control in Turkey, as it did during the Ottoman period. 
The second was to eliminate the Ottoman past to create an all-
encompassing Turkish identity.  
                                                
28 Ibid. 
 




For Ataturk, the promotion of nationalism was an attempt 
to unite the people. In doing so, he would create a sense of loyalty 
to the state by implementing complete “Turkification” through 
symbols of one cultural identity for citizens of the state. To further 
the unification of Turkey, language reform was implemented in 
1928. Ataturk commissioned an organization to produce a Turkish 
alphabet using Latin to replace the existing Arabic alphabet. The 
aim was to completely disassemble the Ottoman past from future 
generations by only promoting a Turkish past and a Turkish 
identity. In a way, the reforms emphasized Turkey as a completely 
united nation. This was in stark, contrast to the instability of the 
region under Ottoman and Islamic rule, and gave leaders the 
legitimacy to claim it as a sovereign state. The unification of 
Turkey was achieved through influence, education, and the 
opportunity for social and governmental involvement. 
The populist reforms created establishments of “People’s 
Houses” throughout Turkey which promoted adult education and 
political ideology to inform the citizens of the reforms that would 
better the country. The grassroots efforts to inform the Turkish 
citizens through state institutions created feelings among citizens 
of equal participation in government affairs.  
The mixture of populism and nationalism went further with 
the reforms in education. Ataturk saw education as an important 
foundation to create a lasting state. The literacy and knowledge of 
a state was gained through education and would be essential for a 
strong Turkish Republic. The main idea for education was again to 
break away from the Ottoman past by dissolving the tradition of an 
elitist education system and implementing a free mandatory 
elementary schooling system throughout Turkey. In the rural areas, 
educational efforts would prove difficult for various reasons. 
Nonetheless, between 1923 and 1940, schools and teachers 
doubled and the number of enrolled students increased by 300 
percent.29 







    The reforms also affected the social roles of Turkish 
women through gender equality. The aim of the broadened equality 
between the sexes was to resemble the freedoms that European 
women possessed. The reforms advanced women on the social 
sphere by allowing them mandatory access to education to acquire 
the skills to work in Turkish society alongside men. The snowball 
effect allowed for thirteen female judges by 1933, women were 
also granted the right to vote by 1934, and there were seventeen 
female delegates in the national assembly by 1935.30 
The reforms greatly aided the state economically and are 
important to the history of Turkey, but the above reforms 
mentioned specifically affected the Kurds in Turkey. Ataturk’s 
reforms helped to establish a uniform Turkish state, whose drastic 
changes directly affected the Kurdish people. The new borders of 
Turkey as defined by the Treaty of Lausanne served as a direct 
antithesis to the Treaty of Sevres as the Kurds were not able to 
obtain an independent Kurdistan. With the promise of their own 
independent state squashed by yet another foreign influence, the 
Kurds were left desperately grasping for a solidified identity in the 
region and so formed oppositional factions within the newly 
formed Turkey.  
The first Kurdish nationalist movement arose against the 
Turkish Republic in 1923 and another in 1925. The uprisings were 
a mixture of Kurdish protest along with Islamic revivalism.31 The 
rebellions were severely dealt with and ended with Ataturk 
attempting to cleanse the Kurdish ethnic history from Turkey. The 
reforms were intended to create one national group that consisted 
of only a Turkish population and left no room for any other 
identity. The intention was to strip the Kurds and others of their 
ethnic cultures by outlawing their languages, clothes, practices and 
subsequently placing them among the lowest class in the Turkish 
society. It was against the law for the Kurds to practice their own 
culture. In the new democracy, it became mandatory for all young 








citizens of Turkey to attend school in efforts to re-educate the 
masses. The schools preached a Western curriculum and promoted 
Turkish nationalism. Ataturk believed education that promoted 
Turkish history and vernacular would lead to faster assimilation of 
nationalism. Unforeseen by Kemal was the outcome education 
would have on the population who learned about ideology and how 
the legality of a republic should work.       
Formation of the PKK32 
 
The Turkish education system limited its participants primarily to 
those who were Turkish which created a class of wealthy elites. 
These elites eventually became aware of the political ideals of 
democracy and its promotion of certain humanitarian rights that 
the Turkish government denied. They learned how to protest on a 
legal basis and soon began to oppose the unjust treatment of 
specific groups by the government, which in turn ignited sparks of 
nationalism bolstered through the creation of various political 
parties. The educated elites gave backing to the military coup of 
1960 and created a liberal period with a new constitution. Aliza 
Marcus in her book, Blood and Belief, wrote that the contents of 
the newly drafted constitution manifested “Freedoms to form 
associations, publish, organize trade unions, and the ability to call 
strikes.”33 These new values gave rise to the many political parties 
controlled by Turkish and Kurdish activists. Kurdish activism now 
consisted of a new generational wave that did not experience the 
punitive end of the first Kurdish nationalist movement of the 
                                                
32 Not all Kurds agree on the approach for independence nor do they agree on 
the end product. These Kurdish factions each have varying ideologies in their 
respective countries. The Yekêtiy Nîştimaniy Kurdistan, Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraq, the Partiya Demokrata Kurdistanê, Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq and the Turkish group Devrimci Yol (DEV-
YOL) which translates to Revolutionary Path were some of the major regional 
opponents of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistani, PKK in Turkey also known as the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party.   
33 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief The PKK and the Kurdish Fight (New York 






1920s. The new generation differed from the old as they were 
better educated with redefined notions of freedom and new 
avenues by which to obtain it. At the same time, the poverty 
stricken Kurdish populations in rural areas began to migrate into 
urban areas in hopes of creating a better livelihood.  The move to 
cities then created a surge of activists from various political arenas.   
In 1961, the first legally organized political party that 
caught Kurdish attention was the Turkish Workers Party (TIP). 
The socialist ideology of the party promoted social and economic 
equality of the classes. The Kurds soon involved themselves within 
TIP, and paper media based on cultural aspects, in addition to the 
Kurdish language, began to be distributed. Unfortunately for the 
activists, the newly ensconced liberal leadership of the Turkish 
Workers Party was shut down after being charged for being a 
separatist party. One after another, legal parties began to be shut 
down or closely monitored. 
  During the 1960s, a rebellious Kurdish identity swelled 
and became a major influence on the preeminent Kurdish 
independence champion, Abdullah Öcalan, endearingly referred to 
by his followers as Apo. In the late 1960s, students and workers 
called meetings to demonstrate their democratic rights by 
protesting the oppression of their cultural identity. Many of the 
young groups had been influenced by their teachers, who were 
Kurdish nationalists and were well immersed in the Kurdish 
culture since their youth and thus viewed the suppression of their 
culture as cruelly unfair. Some Kurds, on the other hand, fell under 
the influence of the radical leftist movements of the 1960s.  
Öcalan was raised in the primarily Kurdish, rural and 
impoverished city of Şanliurfa, inside Turkey’s borders. His family 
was poor, and his mother would often times publicly humiliate his 
father for not being able to sufficiently support his family.  While 
attending school, Öcalan had to walk an hour to and from school. 
His childhood dream was to become a Turkish army officer, but he 
later failed the military school exam. Instead, he went to vocational 
school in Ankara and studied work related to the state land registry 
in 1966. This move influenced Öcalan as he saw the Kurdish 
 




identity through speeches at meetings. By 1969, he worked in a 
government office that oversaw the measuring of land for deeds. 
During this time, Turkey had been in turmoil politically and, 
though hesitant, Öcalan knew something had to be done. 
Coincidentally he turned to a book with new ideas entitled, The 
Alphabet of Socialism.  
Öcalan began to understand the issues through socialist 
ideology and proclaimed himself as a socialist.34 Later in 1972, he 
would be arrested and spent time in prison for attending a 
demonstration. While incarcerated, Öcalan listened to a wide span 
of political ideologies in regards to the causes, effects, and actions 
needed for a revolution. He remained silent, while listening to 
assessments made by imprisoned activists, and was able to realize 
that various organizations went through legal means in order to 
reach their goals. They believed hostile action could be useful, but 
only after gaining sufficient legitimacy and wide support. Öcalan 
did not understand their views as he felt the legal avenue in Turkey 
was corrupt. The political parties throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
had been monitored and shut down each time to take away their 
legitimacy. Öcalan’s assessment of prior attempts through the legal 
system in Turkey inspired an ideological shift on how to attain 
Kurdish independence.  
The primary facets of Öcalan’s path to Kurdish 
independence consisted of ridding the region of all remnants of 
colonialism, terrors of imperialism, and the implementation of the 
socialist ideologies from figures such as Marx, Lenin and Mao. His 
speeches tended to be long-winded and passionate. He engaged in 
debates about which socialist revolution to imitate; Lenin or Mao. 
He believed that debate on the economic and social position of 
Turkey should be relevant and that aggressive socialist action 
would inspire a concurrent nationalist element.  
While trying to figure out which revolutionary model to 
follow, one idea still remained constant among those of Lenin and 
Mao; there was a need for an armed coup, the question was its 
                                                






timing. The parties differed on which stage the fight should be 
used. Öcalan believed that an armed struggle would legitimize the 
Kurdish stance and would allow them to gain followers. Though 
Kurdish nationals agreed on creating an independent Kurdistan, 
they did not agree on a single political dogma. They were divided 
over which leftist ideology to follow, not just in regards to Maoist, 
Leninist, but also on other fundamental leftist groupings. The 
division of ideology was useless in Öcalan’s eyes but, rather than 
let ideology divide the movement, Öcalan believed it was better to 
unite in an armed coup. “‘If a people embraces its own tradition, 
uses its own language and makes it [sic] culture come alive, this 
too is a rebellion,’ … ‘but the highest form of rebellion is armed 
rebellion.’ said Öcalan in his 1977 speech in Elazig, a speech 
which became the basis for the group’s first published pamphlet on 
its ideology.”35 
Öcalan could not gain support from the wide range of 
Kurdish independence parties as they disagreed that an armed coup 
was the necessary first step to legitimacy. This problem created a 
division that prolonged gaining support. The remedy to the 
problem, in regards to Öcalan and his followers, was to eliminate 
the various Kurdish parties. Attacking other groups was the first 
armed struggle for the PKK. They believed by eliminating their 
political rivals, the PKK would be the lone and unopposed Kurdish 
independence party. This strategy was based on the Leninist rule 
and the Maoist philosophy of eliminating other factions to create a 
single imperative party. The PKK’s decision to attack and 
eliminate other Kurdish independence movements would prove to 
be a major thorn in the side of the PKK moving forward. It 
developed into a major diplomatic hurdle in garnering support 
from outside of Turkey.  
The formation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
became official on November 28, 1978. They formed a central 
committee that contained three people; Abdullah Öcalan, Sahin 
Donmez, and Cemil Bayik. The party also included a Regional 
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Preparations Committee with members spread out across Turkey. 
They were asked to stay employed by the state for information, 
while also acquiring new recruits. Some members quit their jobs to 
penetrate trade unions and attack other parties.36 The beginnings of 
the PKK came to a halt following the economic collapse of 
Turkey. This led the military to go on a rampage and cleanse any 
opposition to their power. Öcalan fled from Turkey to Syria, 
leaving the PKK without a leader. The location was initially used 
as a gathering spot for ideas and PKK members. In Syria, Öcalan 
played the old Kurdish card of pitting neighboring states against 
each other for Kurdish preservation.  
At this time, Syria was a location where various groups 
could escape oppression. Once in Syria, Öcalan encountered many 
leftist Palestinian groups whom were sympathetic to his socialist 
agenda. In Damascus, the groups agreed to help the PKK, but 
informed Syrian intelligence services of the PKK’s arrival. The 
Syrian government was fully aware of the continued arrival of the 
Turkish Kurds into their country and distributed fake identity cards 
with Arab names. The acceptance of fake identification by the 
government was their protection against questions on allowing 
Turkish PKK members into Syria. That concept would eliminate 
evidence linking Syrian aid to the Kurdish rebels. The government 
allowed the Kurdish Turks into Syria because the two countries 
had ongoing complications. For example by harboring Turkish 
Kurds, Syria was able to use the PKK as a distraction against 
Turkey. One factor for the tensions were that both countries 
claimed the former jurisdiction of Alexandretta as their own, but 
officially it was absorbed by Turkey in 1939 after a referendum. 
Syria was distressed about Turkey’s GAP dam project. The dams 
harnessed water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for domestic 
purposes. Originating in Turkey, the rivers stem for miles, 
streaming through Syria and Iraq. The dam project would give 
Turkey’s capital, Ankara, abundant control of the water before 
reaching the arid Syrian climate. It was believed Turkey had been 
                                                






harboring an opposition military group, the Muslim Brothers, who 
launched attacks against Syria. In size, Syria is five times smaller 
than Turkey and bordered at that time by the Soviet Union. Turkey 
was a member of NATO and an ally to the United States, as such, 
the Western powers would align with Turkey militarily and Syria 
was painfully aware of this. Thus, the arrival and militant training 
of PKK members was encouraged. Syria used the PKK as a proxy 
to cause regional conflict for their problematic neighbor. The 
Kurdish party held similar notions about Turkey and their 
operations matched Syrian interests. In this instance, the Kurds 
used the disputing neighboring countries for their preservation.37 
The Kurdish people have a long-standing history of using their 
enemy’s enemies for their advantage and self-preservation. 
The admittance of Turkish Kurds into Syria was 
conditional. This is to say that the Turkish Kurds could not 
advocate uprisings regarding the Syrian Kurds. The conditional 
allowance of the PKK into Syria was followed with care because 
Öcalan had discovered his long-term goal in Syria for the PKK. 
While in Syria, the PKK met with another occupied people 
fighting for their independence, the Palestinians. The Palestinian 
groups in Lebanon and Syria received the PKK members with 
open arms and even trained them in guerrilla warfare.  
The DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine), during the 1980s, was one of the largest Palestinian 
groups under the umbrella of the greater PLO (Palestinian 
Liberation Organization). Mamdoh Nofal, the former military 
leader in the DFLP explained, “We accept the Marxist-Leninist 
groups because we are Marxist-Leninist, we are revolutionaries 
and we support the revolutionary movement.”38 Nofal met with 
Abu Laila (Qais Abdul-Karim) a political leader in the DFLP. 
They agreed to take a small number of the group to train. The 
training started during the 1980s in Helwe. The PKK learned about 
explosives, military tactics, topography, artillery, and guerilla 
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tactics.39 Unfortunately for the PKK, funds ran too low for the 
DFLP to continue fully supporting the group. The PKK then 
sought help elsewhere. Aid came from a plethora of Palestinian 
and communist groups: Yasser Arafat of Fatah, George Habash of 
the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), Samir 
Ghoshesh of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF or PSF), 
and the Lebanese Communist Party.40 In return the Kurds helped 
build fortifications and agreed to fight on the front line to defend 
against potential attacks from Israel. The PKK and other militants 
were pushed north following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
Öcalan’s interest then shifted to Northern Iraq as it was the 
ideal location for the PKK to set up camp. The territory, known as 
Üçgen (Turkish for triangle) was a long stretch of land that saddled 
the Iran, Turkey, and Iraq borders. The location was ideal for the 
members to enter into Turkey freely, stage attacks, and then exit 
when needed. Syria offered a great safe haven for the PKK, but not 
for attempting attacks. The path from Turkey to Syria was on flat 
land and party members did not want to draw attention to Syria, by 
aggravating Turkey. The geographical location borrowed by the 
PKK could easily be compromised and Syria, through harboring 
the PKK, could be seen as provoking Turkey. To achieve the goal 
of launching attacks in Turkey, Öcalan needed to make peace with 
the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) who controlled the 
coveted area in the mountainous region bordering Turkey. The 
KDP and surrounding parties were in a constant state of 
competition and disunity with one another in an attempt to obtain 
control of the region. Thus Öcalan reached out to Massoud 
Barzani, leader of the KDP. Massoud Barzani’s father, Mulla 
Mustafa Barzani, was too conservative in Öcalan’s eyes. He held 
on to old feudalistic ideas, and Öcalan harshly criticized Mulla 
Mustafa Barzani because of this. In November 1979, Massoud 
Barzani inherited control of the KDP following his father’s death.  
Öcalan put priorities ahead of ideology, which proved to be 
                                                
39 Ibid., 55. 






diplomatically advantageous. Barzani agreed to put aside Öcalan’s 
past criticism of Barzani’s father and allowed Öcalan to enter KDP 
territory. By 1982, Iran and Iraq were at war and the KDP turned 
on Saddam Hussein, which in turn forced many to relocate and left 
new alliances open for consideration.  
Öcalan used the situation in Iraq to his advantage and 
moved to form an alliance with Barzani. The intentions for the 
location were not seen as temporary for Öcalan, but as a permanent 
spot for the PKK. In 1982, an agreement was reached with Barzani 
to allow the PKK to use the bordering territory. The PKK was 
granted space to build camps in Northern Iraq and to freely cross 
the borders into Turkey. In Syria, the party learned to use and 
make weapons in guerrilla warfare, but in Northern Iraq the PKK 
became knowledgeable with survival in the mountains as a 
guerrilla power. 
Turkey and the PKK 
 
The establishment of Turkey and the creation of the PKK are 
interesting narratives that should be crossed examined for 
similarities. The two entities have been at odds with each other for 
more than three decades each trying to outwit the other by taking 
on the similar roles as a counterpart to become just as legitimate in 
their cause. Both leaders of each nationalist movement were rebels 
of the state. Ataturk’s success of becoming a legitimate force of 
winning his sovereign Turkey can be seen as a product of that 
time. The atmosphere after WWI left many throughout the world 
in complete devastation leaving many world powers absent of the 
will to fight off Ataturk and his forces. Thus, Ataturk won Turkish 
sovereignty without much opposition. Apo created the Kurdish 
movement in a different time where Turkey now had international 
support, an established government, and an army to stop such a 
potential threat leaving Apo’s goal out of reach.  
 Both leading figures of the movement were beloved by 
their followers, leaving a lasting impact on each community. 
Ataturk known as the father of Turkey and Apo known as the 
 




father of the PKK created a power base that left no room for 
oppositions in beliefs, ideology, and a cultural co-existence. 
Ataturk created a uniformed culture crushing any opposing system 
that threated Turkishness, even to the extent of cultural genocide. 
Apo created an absolute power base by manipulating situations to 
create beneficial circumstances for his goals that include his 
switching alliances with various Kurdish resistance groups, murder 
of opposing groups and PKK party members that eventually 
showed opposition to Apo’s decisions, he altered their socialist 
ideology to a democratic system, and even the inclusion of women 
as we will examine later.  
Apo states that he is against Turkey and all it inhabits, but 
uses methods that are vastly similar to his opponent. It would seem 
that Apo learned from Ataturk’s methods to attempt the same goals 
that Ataturk gained from in 1923, essentially to “out Turk the 
Turks”. As we learned and will further explore, the PKK has used 
and continues to use techniques similar to Turkey in order to gain 
international support and awareness to their goal of an independent 
Kurdistan. The interesting aspect is that the female PKK members 
are using the party methods to establish egalitarianism for women 
that will last long after the PKK is gone.  
Öcalan’s Views on Women  
 
Öcalan harbored views on women differently from the culture 
around him. As a young boy, he remembered watching his mother 
humiliate his father. She was very harsh and critical of her son. He 
was also influenced by his sisters’ marriage to a man from a 
neighboring village. His sister Havva was traded for wheat and 
money. Marriage arrangements did not contain aspects of love but 
rather the decisions were made by the parents who would profit 
from the arrangement. Aliza Marcus states in, Blood and Belief, 
“Öcalan later explained he saw such marriages as a type of death 
for women, and former PKK ideologue and scribe Mehmet Can 






theories on the need to liberate women from the repressive roles 
inherent in traditional Kurdish male-female relations.”41   
The first emerging female within the PKK was Öcalan’s 
wife, Kersire Yildrim. They married in 1978, after meeting at a 
journalism school. He received much criticism from his party for 
the union. They did not agree with her family links and believed 
that any relationship with women would bring needless distractions 
that would take away from their fight. Author Aliza Marcus noted 
an interview with a leading member of the PKK on the subject of 
relationships and party members, “PKK supporters viewed 
marriage as a bourgeois undertaking that weakened people’s 
commitment to the fight. ‘From the beginning there was a rule 
against marrying, or maybe not a rule, but it was an idea, a way of 
thinking,’ said Selahattin Celik, a leading PKK member. “Love 
was something for the small bourgeois, something unnecessary.” 
None the less, a number of PKK’s first members were married – 
some, like Öcalan, married other supporters – but the pressures of 
illegal life made it hard to maintain.”42 
The whole party began to understand the idea of marriage 
as a distraction and became a rule for all later members of the party 
both male and female. It was believed that if a member was 
married their focus would shift on family instead of the struggle.  
Öcalan attempted to justify his marriage in terms of helping her 
independence. He explained their marriage would allow her 
freedom to move around Kurdish regions freely, since unmarried 
women were not permitted to travel alone. He also alluded to the 
idea that it would free her from family because they were linked to 
the state.  
Much of the PKK’s ideology came from Öcalan and 
integrating women into the party was one aspect they adopted. If 
we analyze the leader’s view of women it becomes clear as to why 
he allocated women into their movement. Throughout Öcalan’s 
life, he had been influenced by strong women and admitted to 
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being afraid of them at times. He felt this was exemplary 
leadership material to cause fear and believed that women were 
more organized than men as members. The three impacting women 
in his life had been; his mother, his wife, and his beloved sister. He 
viewed his mother and wife as strong and capable of making an 
impact with their actions, he also saw his sister as a woman 
needing to be liberated. He detested the property theme of women 
and wanted to empower them away from a feudal hierarchy. He 
associated feudal life as a western approach to stay in power by 
keeping the rural population embedded in past ideas. His Maoist 
and Leninist approach needed a one party rule with everyone at an 
equal level. The ideology did not leave room for inequality and 
opposition of old cultural and religious practices. He had many 
thoughts on the subject but never attempted to put them in use until 
it was needed. Apo essentially brought women recruits into the 
PKK as a way to fill positions and to keep Kurdish women from 
changing their cultural identity to a Turkish one. The state of 
Turkey, through their reforms, was able to gain female support 
since it allowed gendered freedoms which were denied to them 
living in their Kurdish villages. The Kurdish women were granted 
the ability to enjoy a form of equality through activism in the PKK.  
Formation of Women Activism  
 
Women from various ethnic sectors in the area of Turkey served an 
important purpose during the World Wars and the War for Turkish 
Independence. They joined the fight as nurses on the battlefield, 
suppliers of materials, seamstresses for the men’s uniforms, and 
the economic base during the wars. Women became the economic 
foundation for society as they took on the position of the male role 
in domestic life during the wars aiding the nostalgia of equal 
gender roles. Kurdish women in Turkey have been influenced by 
the 1923 decision to remodel the Turkish republic. Ataturk 
implemented reforms, as stated earlier, that would modernize 
Turkey to resemble Western Europeans. The end goal was to be 






adopting democracy. One aspect of becoming a sovereign Turkey 
was to make all males and females equal under law. Kemal 
decided to establish women’s rights through law which included 
social, legal, and political rights.  
Only few women from elite families were chosen to receive 
equal education as men did and they competed for the same job 
opportunities. This emancipation created more difficulties for 
women because it gave the impression that all women were 
liberated, when most were not. In the article by Meltem Muftuler-
Bac entitled, “Turkish Women’s Predicament,” the author states: 
“This created two types of women in Turkish society: the open, 
western, emancipated woman and the closed, traditional, 
“unliberated” women.”43 This is directly relevant to the study of 
outside ideas that had influence on the Kurdish culture in reference 
to true gender equality within the female gender as seen from a 
male perspective. The vast majority of Kurdish women resided in 
the underdeveloped Kurdish villages in Southeastern Turkey. The 
social structures of the various societies and cultures within Turkey 
create multiple inequalities and prejudices that influence their 
gendered identity. 
The Kurdish society contained disadvantages for their 
women with male dominated customs, methodical economic 
advances to men, political violence, and danger from living in 
conflict zones overtaken by PKK and the Turkish forces. As 
Zeynep Sahin states in her dissertation, “The Political 
Representation of Kurdish, Kemalist, and Conservative Muslim 
Women in Turkey (1990-2010),” Kurdish women have been 
placed within, “systematic inequalities resulting from a lack of 
access to education, legal services, and health services. Worsened 
by language barriers, low levels of education, as well as low levels 
of employment outside of their homes among adult women in 
Southeastern Turkey, leave Kurdish women more vulnerable than 
other women in Turkey.”44  
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Oppressive policies of marital law between 1980 and 1987 
in Turkey had especially affected the Kurdish people which called 
Turkey to a state of emergency within the states lawmaking 
procedures from 1987 to 2002.45  The legislative procedures were 
enacted due to the high levels of domestic violence and honor 
killings in the private sphere of Kurdish provinces.46  
Kurdish women questioned the restrictive actions by the 
Turkish government through various forms of resistance that did 
not always include an armed struggle. Many Kurdish women 
formed levels of resistance through their political positions. They 
formed organizations that protested the lack of human rights for 
Kurds in Turkey in order to bring awareness to the “Kurdish 
question” from the international community. Sahin states that 
“forms of state violence against women have included sexual 
assault, rape, and torture exercised by state agents such as security 
forces, police, and village guards. Sometimes women were forced 
to witness the torture or murder of male relatives. Ill treatment of 
women by state agents was used as a strategy of demoralizing the 
Kurdish community.”47 Female Kurds experienced a “double 
oppression” that shaped the Kurdish response of resistance of the 
1980’s to the modern day.48  
The Turkish state during the military coup in 1980 to 1983 
attempted to stop the Kurdish resistance at all costs which left 
Kurdish women vulnerable. Sahin described an interview she had 
with a Kurdish woman named Hafize Ipek on July 21, 2009. Ipek, 
“a member of the Municipal Council of Yenisehir, Diyarbakir, was 
a university student in the 1980s and was detained for 36 days. ‘I 
was humiliated because of my gender and my ethnic identity. I was 
tortured with beating and electric shocks. I was abused 
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psychologically’.”49 The experiences of the state and the Kurdish 
cultural oppressions influenced the women into action by 
legitimizing Kurdish ethnic nationalism. The result of liberating 
gendered customs of their experienced “double oppression” was 
the belief that by “emancipating themselves through collective 
action and mass mobilization in the Kurdish nationalist 
movements, such that, the Kurdish nation and women would be 
liberated simultaneously.”50 The experienced double oppression 
refers to the cultural or religious oppression and the state or village 
oppression. The Kurdish female movement was a way to legitimize 
their rights as equals in gender relations through acceptance within 
their involvement of activism. 
Women began to assume the role of activist by joining the 
PKK out of necessity for numbers in recruitment as Kurdish 
women traditionally had many restraints within their villages. For 
the reason that PKK members were being jailed and killed in high 
numbers, they were not allowed to roam the villages alone or to 
socialize with men without a guardian. This made it difficult for 
the women to meet the PKK fighters. The PKK was not active in 
the cities, thus resulting in the lack of women recruits in the 1980s. 
The change occurred in 1989, when the PKK created roads into 
colleges and urban areas. The Kurdish group began to publish on 
politics in the 1990s, and gained the attention of women. This 
activity was seen as socially tolerable to family members with 
reference to office work being preferred to mountain fighting. The 
Kurdish community was astonished to find women guerrilla 
fighters carrying guns into villages at night to create propaganda 
and assemble goods.51  
  The allowance of women to join the Kurdish nationalist 
struggle was intended to enable Kurdish independence whereas 
women egalitarianism for the PKK came second. The Kurdish 
locals in eastern Turkey linked female modesty to the honor of the 
land by producing more Kurdish people to expand and honor a 
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Kurdistan to justify sending daughters to fight. In turn, the 
combination created a wider nationalist situation for the Kurdish 
people, specifically the women. Many Kurds in Turkey view the 
Kurdish populations in terms of kinship. As seen in the examples 
above, mothers are known as mother of the nation, and PKK 
members are seen as sons and daughters of the nation. The control 
of female cadres by male party members can be seen as a 
“framework of nationalist forms of kinning,” which is essential for 
young unmarried women joining the party.52 Weiss writes about an 
interview with a party official who spoke of the strict rules 
regarding modesty of female recruits:  
 
If we do not make sure that we respect local values 
and show that we protect the women and their 
honor, parents would decline sending their 
daughters to us.’…Parents often agree to their 
daughters’ political activities exactly because “the 
party is us” the community, where the same 
standards of modesty and honor are enacted as at 
home.53  
 
Many of the Kurdish people residing in their villages of 
Turkey still practice patriarchal religious structures in their 
communities linked to old tendencies of past tribal life when 
kinship was an important tool to survival.  
In the 1990s, women’s roles began to change after a 
military coup. “Tens of thousands of Kurdish men”54 were put in 
prison and forced women to take charge of the societal familial 
role. They became responsible for feeding their families and dealt 
with a challenging government in regards to Turkey’s legal and jail 
systems. This meant that the women were often times brutalized 
                                                
52 Nerina Weiss, “Falling from Grace: Gender Norms and Gender Strategies in 
Eastern Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey 42 (2010): 55-76.  
53 Ibid., 59. 






when dealing with guards or police. This helped to foster the 
revolutionary ideals growing within the Kurdish women.  
Three interviews of women involved with the PKK had 
different experiences in reference to Turkish treatment in prison. 
The article by Nerina Weiss entitled, “Falling from Grace: Gender 
Norms and Gender strategies in Eastern Turkey,” outlines the 
experiences and how the experiences interact with the idea of 
gender equality. The first woman, Fatma was a young woman 
married to a male Kurdish activist. She attended special political 
events but the responsibilities and expectancies of marriage 
generally mark an end to a woman’s political career. At this time, 
Fatma had two young children and was pregnant when her husband 
was arrested. She had to watch her husband beaten and was not 
allowed to get properly dressed. The soldiers’ were able to see her 
exposed in her nightgown and she felt this was as violent as her 
husband’s beating. Her husband was taken away and sentenced to 
multiple years in prison. She went to visit him but, was disgraced 
by male guards who strip searched her. After the birth of her third 
child, she resumed visits and used the baby’s diapers to smuggle 
through letters about the Kurdish movements.55 
 The Turkish soldiers used sexualized acts as transgressions 
in the way of demoralizing or to humiliate the Kurdish society as a 
whole. There were many reports of women being targeted by 
removing their respected female status and violating their moral 
code and conservative manner. The tactic not only afflicted the 
husband and wife, but also the Kurdish people. Kurdish and 
Turkish women share the same societal attitudes, as Muftuler-Bac 
states: “Mediterranean culture…is based on male superiority and 
female inferiority. This is reproduced by women themselves as 
mothers and mothers-in-law.”56 
The Turkish soldiers as noted used the sexual defilement of 
Kurdish women as a weapon of war to symbolically demoralize 
and degrade the Kurdish society. It is through this narrative that 
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one might better understand the PKK’s control over the women by 
allowing the women agency to protect themselves and end Turkish 
attempts to humiliate Kurdish society. Weiss perfectly connected 
the symbolic meaning of sexual violation to the act of war when 
she states: “The physicality of the ethicized body can hardly be 
separated from the symbolic meanings vested in it. In Kurdish 
communities, military and the police often very consciously 
violated local perceptions of good and evil, codes of modest 
conduct, and purity and pollution. As in most conflicts, these 
violations were highly gendered and sexualized.”57 
The second interview of a female activist was of a mother 
who was treated radically different than Fatma. This provides great 
insight to the gender role hierarchy. Handan is an older woman 
with grown children. Her daughter became involved with the PKK, 
which led to her home being searched regularly. Handan and her 
husband were taken into interrogation many times. She was 
interrogated as a parent and not a wife. She did not experience 
humiliating situations; rather her elderly position demanded her 
respect from the interrogators. She enjoyed more societal freedom 
because she was older. She was less likely to be sexually harassed 
and was seen as genderless. This allowed older women a higher 
familial, political, and social status. Handan later went looking for 
her daughter in the mountains. When she found her daughter she 
stayed with her for a few days. While visiting, the young women 
began to call her mother. She became the mother of their unit. 
Handan stated describing her time with the unit that, “these 
guerrilla fighters were not strong heroes: they seemed far too 
young, fragile and longing for their mothers.58  
The third interview with the former guerilla fighter known 
as Zehra was a member of the Democratic Society Party 
(Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP). Weiss’s study displays a 
female fighter that broke the rule of the party’s ban on romantic 
relationships. Zehra grew up in a small Kurdish community in 
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eastern Turkey. Her village had been politically active in the 
Kurdish resistance, in turn influencing Zehra’s involvement. She 
was imprisoned for ten years, but after her release became a high-
ranking cadre in the DTP. In Zehra’s position, the party enlisted 
her the task of reviewing the local political structure and to clean 
out the ranks of those who lacked the Kurdish cause. Her 
judgments were highly respected giving her the right to criticize 
the community and party officials. Zehra was respected but 
unpopular for her harsh reproach of many high-ranking party and 
community members accusing them of using the party for personal 
gain and in opposition to the purity of the Kurdish fight.  
Zehra held a high position in the party structure and was 
known as the queen (Kralice) from her effectiveness in the party.59 
As firm as she was on the dealings of local officials she opposed 
the structure of the strict rules against romantic relationships of 
party members. Zehra believed that a member could be a 
committed to the party and have a personal life. She was also 
offended by her ascribed identity as an “erkek-kadin, meaning a 
man-woman.”60 Being a trusted member of the party, Zehra was 
able to socialize alone with male members without the start gossip. 
On one of the outings, the male member received a phone call 
from his girlfriend and became upset that he was out with a female 
cadre alone. The male member calmed his significant other by 
stating it was fine because Zehra was a erkek-kadin. The term 
meant there was no sexual desire for the male member because 
Zehra was basically seen as a man. The two terms ascribed to 
female members in the Kurdish parties are defined as, “while a 
women addressed as an erkek has the male characteristics of 
bravery and self-control, an erkek-kadin transgresses gendered 
boundaries and imitates men without having internalized the 
necessary (positive) characteristics of a man.”61 The term surprised 
her and created the need to discredit that ascribed identity because 
Zehra saw herself as a normal woman who wanted marriage and 
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children at some point. She challenged the gender roles of the party 
structure by frequently claiming her right to familial normalcy 
while still maintaining a dedicated role in the party. Zehra differed 
from other female fighters who disclaimed a “normal life” of 
cultural customs for the contextual gender equality in the Kurdish 
resistance. Other female cadres feared the punishments for 
resisting the structural identity of asexuality and the rule against 
relationships.  
 The former guerilla fighter organized her marriage to a 
prominent political activist in the party to begin her family. The 
marriage created a major disturbance within the party and led to 
the removal of both Zehra and her husband from their positions in 
the DTP. The former queen “was accused of disloyalty, betrayal, 
and treason.”62 She was initially sentenced to death for her offense, 
but the decision was altered to her expulsion from the party and 
society. However, Zehra’s husband received less scrutiny and 
punishment as he was welcomed back into the party, but denoted 
in rank.   
The three experiences begin to explain why the Kurdish 
women join the PKK. Many join to escape the repressive life of 
their Kurdish villages, but are stripped of their gender identity and 
given a new form of an “emancipated gender.” Once a woman is 
involved with the PKK they are no longer seen as a woman, but 
referred to as a man. They lose all ties to femininity and are seen as 
asexual. If captured by Turkish soldiers the female fighters no 
longer had the gendered title as female. If Turkish soldiers 
attempted to humiliate or demoralize the Kurdish culture with the 
captive, it would no longer work. To diminish the sexuality of 
female fighters to that of no gendered identity strips their worth as 
a reproducing mother of the Kurdish people and in a sense lose 
their importance to the Kurds as someone that needs protection.     
Overtime the Kurdish women filled positions of branched 
organizations of the PKK such as the ERNK (The Kurdish 
People’s Liberation Front), political networks, and the Kurdish 
                                                






Parliament in Exile military activities. The membership offshoots 
that aided the PKK worked in and around European countries to 
establish awareness for the Kurdish problem in Turkey by creating 
propaganda and intelligence activities, street demonstrations, and 
media support. Many women joined the armed struggle and were 
openly accepted. The female fighters were instrumental to the PKK 
because women were able to bypass the security inspection points 
in Turkey with ease. Sahin in an interview with Ali Kemal Ozcan 
in 2007, received the following answer to why women were 
accepted into the armed fight, “female militants often have better 
access to certain targets, such as police control points, public 
gatherings, and parades. In addition, women launched suicide 
attacks more easily than men. During the 1990s, the PKK launched 
15 suicide attacks, 11 of them by women.”63  
Conclusion 
 
The brief background to Kurdish history set the foundation to the 
understanding of Kurdish people’s right to exist as their own 
nation and culture. The Kurdish people are one of the oldest ethnic 
and cultural groups to the Middle East. The Kurds have co-existed 
for centuries with various civilizations and received little 
opposition to how they should live. It was the entrance of 
European imperialism that altered the Middle Eastern inhibitors 
and the Kurdish way of life. The alterations of the old practices to 
the western principles of economy, ideology, racism, secularism, 
the false promises of the world wars, and nationalism vastly 
changed the Middle East and are directly responsible for the 
current conflicts. The history also displayed the religious 
background that divided the Kurds and assisted in the inequality of 
women in their societal structure. The female fighters of the PKK 
and other Kurdish factions state that they fight in the resistance to 
gain a sovereign Kurdistan, but to also bring gender egalitarianism 
in the Kurdish communities. Many Kurdish communities follow 
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their religious or cultural customs of male dominance that restrict 
women in their societies. The young Kurdish women are subjected 
to be slaves to men as Mitra later stated in her interview. Females 
are restricted in their movement through the villages by needing a 
familial male chaperon, they have limited access to education, and 
many suffer from arranged marriages. The arranged marriages by 
male family members take away physical ownership and rights to 
the women’s bodies. Many Kurdish women in Turkey and 
throughout the Middle East as noted, experienced abusive 
husbands, honor killings, and rape which clarifies the Kurdish 
females need to join the PKK and gain some equality or ownership 
over themselves.  
The formation of Turkey by Ataturk was a monolithic 
alteration to the Kurdish people and their identity. Ataturk’s 
reforms attempted to strip the Kurdish identity from Turkey 
through legal and violent force. A major key factor that pushed the 
Kurdish response was the reform of education and later gender 
equality. The educational reforms altered the thinking of the Kurds 
by granting them a western knowledge. The Kurds were able to 
implement western thought to evoke ideology and nationalism that 
they were now ready to effectively fight for because they 
understood the power behind both ideas. The gender equality 
reforms greatly affected the Kurdish women through legal gender 
rights. Many Kurdish women in rural villages were not affected by 
the new laws, but it set the standard that made a lasting effect on 
Apo’s PKK by including women in the fight. The main goal for 
Apo was to gain numbers and to eliminate the backwardness of the 
patriarchal customs by becoming emancipated into a new form of 
women-hood. The PKK utilized the methods of striping the past 
much like the Kemalist reforms attempted. 
The formation of the Kurdish resistance in response to 
Ataturk’s reforms that intended to create one cultural Turkish 
identity is essential to the female fighters. The PKK background 
allows for an understanding of Kurdish agency against their 
cultural genocide, but also sets the foundation for the inclusion of 






restricted by male dominance, they enjoy more freedom in the 
PKK compared to their life in the villages.  
Female involvement in various Kurdish resistance 
movements allows for the possibility of liberation and 
empowerment from otherwise restrictive gender roles in rural 
Kurdish villages. Women that join the resistance gain self-worth 
and can negotiate their position within Kurdish communities. They 
are able to utilize their political positions to protect themselves 
from the daily constraints of honor and shame from their local 
communities and threats from Turkish forces. The party represents 
empowerment as a process for women to have control over their 
lives and decisions. Many interviews with the female fighters do 
not consider themselves at a disadvantage or in need of saving; 
instead they compare their old life of restraints to bolster the 
validation of their new social and political opportunities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
At first glance, the members of the PKK seem to share the 
same restrictions in the party structure of no sexual or marital 
relations. A closer view of the restrictions show that romantic 
relationships of male guerilla fighters is severely frowned upon 
and if caught, a demotion in rank is the punishment. On the other 
hand, the female guerilla fighters receive major repercussions for 
breaking the rules. The women’s punishments vary depending on 
the area, but the most extreme is a death sentence. For many 
women cadres the punishments are more likely to be elimination of 
membership to the party and to be ostracized by the PKK and the 
Kurdish communities. The main contributor to the harsh 
punishments for females is to make the example that sexual 
relations for women will not be tolerated to keep families in the 
villages secure in trusting the PKK with their daughters honor. The 
female fighters within the party structure enjoy the freedoms of 
guerilla life even with their conditional equality.  
Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999 and brought to 
Turkey. Öcalan was sentenced to death, but the sentence was 
altered to life imprisonment. The leading members of the PKK 
halted the violence to a low point. Attacks reemerged when the 
Iraqi Kurds obtained an Independent State in 2006. This echoed 
 




the long awaited achievement of a Kurdish fight for autonomy. 
The possession of cultural independent home drove the Turkish 
Kurds to hope for their own Independent Kurdistan.   
Conflict between the Turkish Kurds and Turkey is an 
ongoing dispute. Determining a solution to the situation is difficult 
because the opposing sides use hostile actions to gain control. In a 
recent development, On March 21, 2013, Öcalan called out to the 
PKK to cease fire. According to the Turkish Government, Öcalan 
and Turkish leaders have been in negotiations to give the Turkish 
Kurds cultural rights in the upcoming constitution. Since 2013 to 
the present there has been a cease fire for peace talks with Turkey 
about Kurdish rights. From July 30th to July 5th, 2013, the PKK 
changed its leadership remarkably choosing a male and a female 
leader to head the PKK. The duel gendered power base is meant to 
create an illusion to the Turkish community that Kurdish women 
do receive the same rights and power that male members enjoy. 
Both members along with the conference members elected Öcalan 
as president and commander of the PKK.64 
 The gendered violations experienced by the females of the 
PKK are doubled by the Turkish military and the unequal 
structures of the PKK. The Kurdish women are willing to die to 
enjoy a form of freedom in the PKK that they otherwise would not 
experience in their Kurdish villages. The Kurdish women around 
the Middle East are using their role within the Kurdish resistance 
for a new conflict that is unrelated to the sole cause of Kurdistan. 
The Kurdish inclusion of women to the fight has allowed for the 
opening of a new social setting for women as feminist. As Weiss 
stated, “The Kurdish political arena had opened a context for 
women to appropriate new space. Women have taken up political 
offices and challenged the male dominance within the party 
itself.”65 The female guerilla fighters understood the PKK needed 
numbers and did not necessarily care about gender egalitarianism, 
but recently the women have gained the upper hand. They have 
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learned to use the Kurdish card of self-preservation and using 
situations to their advantage. Male members of the PKK have also 
provided gender equality as a demand in Kurdish independence, 
subsequently giving Kurdish women legitimacy. The women have 
stepped into the public arena presenting to Kurdish society 
throughout the Middle East that they enjoy true equality in the 
Kurdish groups. By creating public legitimacy and rallying for 
women rights, society leaves an open space for the women to enjoy 
more freedoms when the Kurdish resistance is over. They have 
proven their right to gender equality by fighting alongside the men 
of the PKK and when the fight is over men will not be able to take 
female freedoms away. The Kurdish female guerilla fighters have 
thus successfully introduced a paradigm for their ultimate 
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